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COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE INFLATION TARGETERS 
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ABSTRACT 
The inflation-growth relationship for the inflation targeters is estimated for the period 2001-2006. 
The results show that inflation is negatively correlated with economic growth, while the indicators 
for aggregate demand and aggregate supply are positively correlated with economic growth. The 
findings suggest that a combination of economic policies is more fruitful than a singular focus on 
inflation targeting. This conclusion is applicable to the case of the Philippines, where inflation is 
often driven by aggregate supply-linked factors rather than demand-linked factors. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Whether or not inflation targeting promotes economic growth has produced a rather large body of 
literature. Bruno and Easterly (1998), Pollin and Zhu (2005), and Epstein and Yeldan (2007), for 
example, find that economic growth remains possible even when there is a moderate level of 
inflation in the range of 15-20 per cent. They thus argue that it is the way inflation targeting is 
pursued, which emphasizes a deflation stance that brings about lower economic growth and weak 
jobs generation. Inflation targeting thus brings about costs that exceed the purported benefits. The 
conclusion that one makes from such studies is that if inflation targeting leads to the realization of 
very low inflation (often, in the range of 1 to 3 per cent) that problems arise because the resulting 
policy stance does not engender broad-based economic performances, defined as stable and robust 
economic growth that produces increasing average incomes, equitable distribution of benefits and 
opportunities, as well as more jobs. 
But Grier and Tullock (1989), Barro (1996), and Ghosh and Phillips [1998], among others, 
find a negative correlation between inflation and economic growth. They also point out that there 
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can be a nonlinear relationship between inflation and economic growth. Of course, the experiences 
of many countries indicate that in addition to curtailing economic growth, high levels of inflation 
also bring about other adverse consequences on the economy. For example, the instabilities that 
emerge with the reduction in economic growth lead to the suppression of investments and jobs, in 
turn, further curtailing growth, thereby producing a vicious cycle of stagflation. The high levels of 
inflation necessitate significant economic adjustments that not only derail economic growth but 
also push the economy to lower growth trajectories; and these are ultimately costly to societies. 
Thus Feldstein (1997), Corbo et al. (2001), and Miskin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), among others, 
stress that on balance the benefits of inflation targeting exceed the costs. They also indicate that if 
inflation targeting is applied well the economy is stabilized, thus contributing to a virtuous cycle 
of economic growth and jobs generation that ultimately results in the realization of broad-based 
economic performances. 
Interestingly though, other proponents of inflation targeting like Blinder (1998), Bernanke 
et al. (1999), Dueker and Fisher (2006) point out that inflation targeting is not necessarily superior 
to other stabilization policies. In fact, they contend that the purported benefits of low levels of 
inflation can be achieved using some alternative economic strategies. The idea is that if there are 
more policy instruments available to policy makers, they options on how to achieve stabilization 
and expansion, and so the situation becomes more favorable for realizing broad-based economic 
performances. Furthermore, Arestis and Sawyer (2005), Ball and Sheridan (2005), and Roger and 
Stone (2005), among others, argue that it is also possible that the success of inflation targeting is 
brought about by other factors but not inflation targeting itself. Global economic slowing down of 
inflation as favorable supply factors relieve pressures on prices or a global economic slowdown as 
demand factors weaken due to deflationary policies, or both, translate as reductions in domestic 
inflation and thus the success of inflation targeting.  
The debate on whether or not inflation targeting brings more benefits than costs continues. 
The same can be said on the debate on the tradeoff between inflation and economic growth. This 
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paper addresses the latter debate. It specifically examines the relationship between inflation and 
economic growth among the inflation targeters. The sample of countries is further narrowed down 
to comprise those that have pursued inflation targeting for at least five years. Obviously, there are 
adjustments in the conduct of monetary policy in the run up to the adoption of inflation targeting.  
The proposition of the paper is that inflation targeting is a desirable because it contributes 
to the realization of robust economic growth. And because inflation targeting is increasingly being 
included in stabilization and liberalization programs, the results have policy implications. Thus if 
the results suggest that inflation targeting contributes to the realization of robust economic growth, 
those that have not adopted inflation targeting may need to rethink the usefulness of targeting. But 
if the result does not support the purported relationship, those who are pursuing inflation targeting 
may need to reconsider the policy and, by extension, consider alternative strategies.  
The next section presents the methodology and after that, the empirical results. Philippine 
inflation targeting is discussed in the fourth section, together with the implication of the results to 
the country. The last section concludes.  
2. METHODOLOGY 
This paper attempts to empirically verify the association between inflation and economic growth 
among the inflation targeters using the model Y = α + Xβ + ε, where Y is gross domestic product 
growth rate and X is a vector of control variables including inflation, aggregate demand-linked 
indicators (e.g., government expenditures, and current account deficits), and aggregate supply-
linked indicators (e.g., gross fixed capital formation, education expenditure per student, and labor 
force). In addition, a region dummy is included to capture differences in economic performance 
between the emerging and industrialized economies, with a value of 1 for the former. There are 
period dummies to capture the trend in global economic growth. Interaction terms are included to 
capture other relationships that can also explain economic growth, albeit in a rudimentary manner. 
Except for the dummy variables, the rest of the variables in the model are in growth forms (in 
2000 constant prices).  
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For this paper, inflation targeters are countries that have employed inflation targeting in 
the period 2001-2006. These countries are listed at the end of the paper. The data are taken from 
the World Development Indicators 2007. The panel regression was estimated using EViews. 
3. WIN OR LOSE? 
Table 1 summarizes the regression runs. Column 1 is the basic result, where economic growth is 
regressed with inflation together with region and period dummies. Inflation is found to be strongly 
negatively correlated with economic growth. In fact, the results for the various specifications show 
that inflation and economic growth are negatively correlated. Economic growth is thus sensitive to 
inflation, at least for the inflation targeters. Columns 2 and 3 show that both quadratic and lagged 
inflation are not statistically significant, albeit the expected signs are obtained. In other words, the 
coefficients are not statistically different from zero. They are not pursued further in the analysis. 
But the results suggest that inflation does not have a nonlinear relationship with economic growth 
perhaps because its impact on the growth of inflation targeters is in the immediate period.  
Columns 4 to 8 present the results using the aggregate demand-linked indicators. They 
show that the indicators for government and current account expenditures are strongly positively 
correlated with economic growth. The magnitude of each coefficient is small but their total is 
comparable to the magnitude of the coefficient on inflation. Altogether, columns 4 to 8 reveal that 
the aggregate demand-linked indicators can explain an average of 11 basis points of economic 
growth, while that of inflation is an average of 19 basis points. These findings are not surprising 
on closer review because inflation targeters typically carry out restrictive expenditure policies. 
How much of economic growth can be explained by the aggregate demand-linked indicators is 
limited as a result.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
The results suggest that aggregate demand-linked indicators can be important drivers of 
economic growth. The more important point is that such findings support the contention that 
Keynesian policies remain useful in engendering economic growth. If aggregate demand-linked 
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indicators are enhanced with appropriate policies that allow for greater public sector involvement 
and agreeable spending targets, they can have more contribution to economic growth, leading to a 
cumulative process and thus realizing robust economic growth. 
The next results are for the aggregate supply-linked indicators. Columns 9 to 12 indicate 
that the total of the coefficients explain between 12 and 13 basis points of economic growth and, 
again, these figure are comparable to inflation’s. The results for the supply-linked indicators are to 
be expected. Standard growth theory contends that aggregate supply-linked indicators are inputs 
to economic growth. Thus the combination of adequate capital and well-educated labor force – by 
extension, labor that can productively utilize capital to generate more output – engender robust 
economic growth. The results thus support the proposition that supply-side policies remain useful 
in engendering economic growth. It is for this reason that governments need policies that not only 
attract capital that bring in additional resources and technology domestic productivity growth and 
set off industrialization. At the same time, policies are needed to ensure human capital formation 
to fully exploit capital. The enhancement of the supply-side factors to support economic growth in 
turn sustains production in a cumulative process, thus resulting in robust economic growth. 
Finally, the lower half segment of Table 1 presents the results for other dummy indicators 
and the interaction terms. Thus emerging economies have higher average economic growth than 
industrialized economies. That simply suggests that the former are on the steeper segments of their 
growth trajectories, while the latter are on the flatter segments of their trajectories. The coefficient 
on the interaction terms such as capital formation in the emerging economies indicates that capital 
there has a lower contribution to economic growth than in the industrialized economies. Indeed, it 
is to be expected that the productivity of capital is higher in the latter than in the former. Lastly, 
the period dummies confirm the contention that the global trend in economic growth is increasing 
from 2001, shown by the progressively decreasing coefficients. 
These results basically confirm the negative correlation between inflation and economic 
growth, as argued by Grier and Tullock (1989), Barro (1996), and Ghosh and Phillips (1998). But 
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the increase in economic growth with inflation targeting is not as big as argued by proponents of 
inflation targeting. As such, aiming for a lower level of inflation of, say, 1 per cent can lead to a 
potential economic growth of 5.7 per cent among the emerging economies and 4.3 per cent for the 
industrialized economies (Column 1), excluding the time trend. The reason for a limited outcome 
is that inflation targeters already have low levels of inflation at an average of 2.8 per cent among 
the emerging economies and 1 per cent among industrialized economies. Further gains in terms of 
economic growth cannot be had through inflation targeting alone.   
The threshold at which inflation ceases economic growth in the inflation targeters is at an 
average of 24.10 per cent (averaging the results from Columns 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12) which is 
comparable to the figures of Bruno and Easterly (1998) and Pollin and Zhu (2005). The point is 
that an increase in economic growth is possible if inflation targeting is relaxed. Taking up the 
empirical results that the aggregate demand- and supply-linked indicators contribute to raising 
economic growth by a comparable amount to inflation targeting, it can be argued that pursuing a 
combination of policies is a better strategy for achieving broad-based economic performances. 
This point is important because the mainstream approach generates fear of inflation, which can 
turn out to be a not healthy situation for the inflation targeters. Such a stance is especially 
problematic when there are unutilized domestic capacities and possibilities are available to create 
new capacities to support robust economic growth. 
Moreover, the verified negative correlation between inflation and economic growth can 
be due to the fact that the inflation targeters have stabilized their inflations. Recent global trends 
in inflation can also be additional support to the positive performances of the inflation targeters. 
Additionally, this verified negative correlation can exist because inflation targeters have taken up 
financial liberalization that has made governments to take up conservative fiscal and monetary 
policies. This frugality has contributed to compromise productivity, incomes and social objectives 
that weaken economic performances. But, of course, proponents of inflation targeting stress that a 
financially liberalized economy is a desirable policy in itself because where capital and finance 
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remain regulated, inflation targeting cannot function well. Additionally, they point out that non-
financially liberalized economies mean that governments have too much policy space to respond 
to domestic demands at the expense of external consideration, particularly capital. Nonetheless, it 
needs to be noted that where the external sector can impose on domestic policies, aggregate 
demand- and supply-enhancement policies are difficult to pursue because capital can go on strike 
against expansionary policies. Jobs targeting and industrial policy, for example, are frowned upon 
because they are seen as inflation-creating.  
Inflation targeting by itself explains little of broad-based economic performances. From a 
policy point of view, a positive combination of policies it is argued that to be better for carrying 
out monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, productivity, incomes, and social objectives of economies. 
This latter approach is preferred where there are excess capacities manifested by unemployment 
and idle resources. Such a combination of policies is more constructive, progressive, and brings 
about more desirable outcomes. Pursuing a broader mix of policies can be Pareto improving and 
thus a desirable situation. Accordingly, the present configuration of inflation targeting needs to be 
modified to make it compatible for broad-based economic performances. Needless to say, high 
levels of inflation are harmful, but too low inflations are equally harmful. But the point is that the 
gains to inflation targeting can be enlarged with demand- and supply-linked policies to support 
and enhance economic growth.  
There is one more item before proceeding to discuss Philippine inflation targeting. About 
30 to 50 per cent of economic growth is explained by the indicators used in the regressions. There 
can be a higher explanatory power if additional indicators are added in the model. Feder (1983), 
Esfahani (1991), and Wacziarg (2001), for example, suggest that international trade can enhance 
economic growth. The impact of trade can be transmitted via its effect on productivity increases 
and spillovers effects. Beck et al. (2000) and Bekaert et al. (2001), for example, suggest a similar 
effect for international finance, with foreign direct investments bringing in better technology and 
enhancing productivity, for example. Such studies stress the supply-side factors to growth. But an 
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alternative approach that emphasize the demand-side dimension to economic growth can also be 
adopted, specifically those by Kaldor (1967), Thirlwall (1979), and Thirlwall and Hussain (1982). 
At this point, however, data constraint does not allow us to estimate such extensions that embed a 
cumulative causation of variables. For now, it is enough to argue that there are good reasons to 
expand the analysis to include other determinants of economic growth, particularly to capture the 
potential positive effects of sound execution of international trade and finance that can lead to a 
cumulative process of economic expansion, which undermine the view that inflation targeting 
itself engenders economic growth.1  
4. PHILIPPINE INFLATION TARGETING 
Inflation targeting was adopted in the Philippines in the beginning of 2002, but its genesis can be 
traced two years earlier.2 This change is seen as a welcome development considering that the 
previous policy of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (henceforth, Bangko Sentral) was monetary 
targeting, which was evidently harmful to the economy evidenced by severe deflation in the early 
1980s. Monetary targeting tended to be restrictive especially during periods of severe balance of 
payments imbalances and accelerations in inflation. In turn, monetary targeting contributed to 
worsen the economic problems, resulting in greater economic contractions that expected. 
Philippine inflation targeting has important features that allow for flexibility.3 The first is 
an escape clause, which releases the Bangko Sentral from sticking to the letter in order achieve 
the inflation target. The reason for this innovation is that extenuating circumstances such as 
disruptions in the domestic supplies of goods (especially, food items), natural calamities, or 
shocks in international supplies (especially, oil and raw materials) that upset the domestic market 
result in an inflationary push. Policy change like the introduction of an expanded value added tax 
                                                
1 This dimension in the determinants of economic growth is the subject of another paper.  
2 Lim (2006) presents a comprehensive analysis of Philippine inflation targeting and discusses alternative 
policies for broad-based economic performances. Dumlao (2004), Dumlao (2005), and Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas (2005) are debates published in this journal.  
3 Inflation targeters such as Canada, Czech Republic, New Zealand, and South Africa have escape clauses. 
The use of headline and core inflation in inflation targeting is not common among inflation targeters. Other 
economies that employ core inflation are South Korea, Norway, and Thailand. 
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or large devaluation can be inflationary, which makes monetary policy less effective. The escape 
clause thus allows the Bangko Sentral some leeway to assess the situation to know if an 
adjustment in monetary policy is necessary. 
Another feature of Philippine inflation targeting is the core and headline inflation setup.4 
Core inflation excludes factors that are directly connected to the extenuating circumstances under 
the escape clause, while the latter is the standard measure of inflation. This setup basically allows 
the Bangko Sentral flexibility to not adjust monetary policy as long as core inflation remains 
within target. In so doing, it has adopted an approach that is similar to that of the United States 
Federal Reserve, which takes the robustness of the economy as the primary concern in adjusting 
monetary policy to allow for discretionary monetary policy.  
Philippine inflation targeting, as such, has been benign to support economic performance.  
But the irony is that precisely because of variables beyond the control of the Bangko Sentral that 
inflation targeting has no significant consequence on economic performance. In other words, the 
character of the monetary policy has been passive-supporter to economic performance rather than 
active-instigator, albeit the Bangko Sentral is bounded by the Bangko Sentral Act of 1993 to focus 
on price stability.  
The Bangko Sentral has invoked the escape clause since 2004.5 Because of extenuating 
circumstances, the Bangko Sentral has opted not to adjust monetary policies, except in 2005 when 
it raised interest rates perhaps to ward off speculations as the Philippines went into a fiscal bind 
and partly because core inflation exceeded the target. In 2002 and 2003, inflation was 3 and 3.5 
per cent, respectively; both were below the target of 4.5 to 5.5 per cent. Falling food prices as 
agricultural production recovered in 2003 and subdued demand following the decline in global 
economic performance in 2001 as United States and Europe slowed down while Japan remained 
                                                
4 The Bangko Sentral’s primer on inflation targeting is available from: http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/ 
Publications/FAQs/targeting.pdf 
5 The Open Letters of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to the President are available from: 
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/monetary/open.asp, while the Quarterly Reports on Inflation from: http://www.bsp.  
gov.ph/publications/regular_inflation.asp 
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stagnant contributed to mild inflation. An extended dry spell increased the pressure on inflation, 
but it was moderated with excess capacities in the economy and falling global oil prices. 
Meantime, the Bangko Sentral set inflation targets at 4.5 to 5.5 per cent because of the perceived 
higher risks in the following year in consideration of an economic slowdown as the United States 
remained unstable, Japan stagnant, and oil prices increased following the United States - Iraq War.  
 Inflation in 2004 rose to 6 per cent, higher than the target of 4 to 5 per cent. Higher prices 
were caused by factors related to food and energy products, including record-breaking oil prices 
that led to increases in domestic transportation and utilities costs that actually continued into 2005. 
Increases in the prices of meat products were in part driven by increases in demand because of the 
avian flu scare in Asia. Weather-related disturbances, such as a series of typhoons in 2004 and the 
extended dry season in the first half of 2005, aggravated the situation. Surges in food prices seem 
to push inflation outside the targets. As the global economy expanded and production capacities 
were used up, demand increased global oil and inputs prices thereby increasing domestic cost of 
production and transportation and utility, inducing adjustments in domestic wages. Consequently, 
inflation reached 7.6 per cent, exceeding the 5 to 6 per cent target, even as agriculture production 
recovered and oil prices eased up late in 2005. 
Inflation increased early in 2006 in part the result of the increase in value added tax from 
10 to 12 per cent, which was imposed in 2005. But the increase in inflation was largely a one-shot 
rise in prices, and its impact dissipated from 2006. The recovery of agriculture production and the 
steady strengthening of the peso eased the pressure on inflation. The latter mitigated the impact of 
high oil prices and reduced inflation. As oil prices eased up in the latter part of 2006 and robust 
economic expansions continued, inflation reached 6.2 per cent, still higher than the target of 4 to 
5 per cent.  
Inflation as of August 2007 is within the target of 4 to 5 per cent despite an extended dry 
season and heavy spending in the national elections. Fortunately, the rapid expansion in the first 
half of 2006 has not resulted in increases in prices. The peso continued to be strong, while inputs 
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and oil prices have remained stable. All these have sustained the downtrend in inflation, reaching 
an average of 2.7 per cent by mid year. If global demand will remain steady even with the housing 
sector problem in the United States, inflation target for 2007 will actually be met. If an economic 
adjustment will occur in the United States and if Japan remains unable to resolve its economic 
doldrums, a repeat of global deflation like 2001 to 2003 is possible. Even with the peso weakening 
in the second half of 2007, sustained domestic expansion can actually cancel out the pressures on 
inflation. Either way, the inflation target can be met not because the Philippines is successful in 
doing so but because it passively did so. 
The Philippines has tended to have higher and variable inflations due to supply shocks 
and exchange rate fluctuations translate into higher domestic prices. Swings in the exchange rate 
are linked to shocks in the external sector like balance of payments problems, often connected to 
factors such as sudden and massive outflow of capital or excessive increases in imports relative to 
export earnings that contribute to foreign exchange shortages. The scarcity of foreign exchange in 
turn causes the peso to weaken, resulting in increases in the cost of imports. Imported inflation 
feeds into the overall level of consumer prices.  
There are also real sector shocks. Volatile food prices are the result of low agricultural 
productivity and weather conditions. The former is partly the consequence of the lack of better 
agricultural support and development to ensure ample harvests. A related problem is the limited 
road and transportation network that facilitate the timely and cost-effective distribution of 
agricultural goods to various parts of the country. Meanwhile, the existing roads, bridges, ports 
are in need of improvements to enhance access to markets. These changes require comprehensive 
efforts to raise farm productivity.  
In the monetary sector, an important source of high inflation is large fiscal deficits, which 
in the past was financed through excessive money growth, thus generating inflationary pressures. 
This situation is less of an issue today because the Bangko Sentral can pursue monetary policy 
without undue pressures coming from the fiscal sector.  
 12
Proponents of Philippine inflation targeting argue that since its implementation, economic 
performance has been significantly healthier because of price stability. Indeed, current trends are 
better compared to previous decades in Philippine economic history. But too much credit is given 
to inflation targeting rather than the role of other factors that contribute to inflation stabilization.6 
Increasingly, actions that lead to an expansion of domestic demand and providing complementary 
policies to strengthen institutions and infrastructures are considered with caution and always seen 
to be inflationary.7 Perhaps because monetary policy in the Philippines does not anymore play an 
active developmental role that any demand-linked policy is not desirable, even though it can lead 
to cumulative process of robust economic growth, expansion of productive capacities, and further 
expansions. It needs to be pointed out that global economic trends have been important factors as 
well in the recent economic performances of the Philippines, including that on inflation targeting.  
Ironically, inflation targeting can take policy away from addressing fundamental domestic 
issues that constrain the economy from realizing broad-based economic performance. Persistent 
unemployment, fiscal difficulties because of high public debt, volatile exchange rate and capital 
flows because of more open capital accounts, low investments because weak investor confidence 
plus uncertainties, and so on, are factors that inflation targeting cannot address. Even conceding 
the empirical results in Table 1 that low levels of inflation can bring about stronger economic 
growth, the contribution of inflation targeting is muted in the case of the Philippines because other 
                                                
6 The net effect of inflation on economic growth is -2 basis points: 
Grow = 4.38 – 0.163 Inflation + 0.139 Inflation*Philippines + 1.34 Emerging Country – 2.21 Dummy 2001  
            [0.00]  [0.01]                  [0.22]                                       [0.00]                                [0.00] 
– 1.79 Dummy 2002 – 1.53 Dummy 2003 – 0.243 Dummy 2004 – 0.724 Dummy 2005 
  [0.00]                        [0.00]                         [0.61]                           [0.13] 
Adj. R2 = 0.318     F-Stat. = 7.262 
7 Adding the government expenditures and current account balance in the model in Footnote 3 improves the 
regression results. The sum of their coefficients indicates a contribution of 17 basis points to economic 
growth, while the net effect of inflation to growth is 3 basis points. Results are available from the author. 
Only fixed capital formation is statistically significant, while both education expenditure and labor force 
growth are not. The results on education, however, can be considered weakly significant. In the latter case, 
the sum of the coefficients indicates a contribution of 14 basis points while the net effect of inflation to 
growth is 13 basis points, implying that expansions in aggregate supply-linked factors can induce growth 
that in turn induce expansions in demand-linked factors, thus generating stronger expansions. Results are 
available from the author. 
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constraints are decisive in impinging on its economic performance. The irony in this case is that 
because of successful economic performances in recent years, inflation targeting is also 
successful, and not the other way around. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper investigated the relationship between inflation and economic growth for the inflation 
targeters over the period 2001-2006. The findings confirmed that inflation is negatively correlated 
with economic growth. But the results confirmed that economic growth and inflation targeting 
reflect global trends and that aggregate demand- and supply-linked indicators can play positively 
roles in engendering economic growth. Their contributions to economic growth are comparable to 
that of inflation targeting.  
 The paper presented an analysis of Philippine inflation targeting in light of the empirical 
results. It was argued that the good economic performance of the Philippines in recent years has 
been important in the success of inflation targeting, not the other way around. The Philippines can 
achieve robust economic growth by inducing expansions through aggregate demand- and supply-
linked factors. A broad set of economics policies complemented with strengthening of institutions 
and provision of infrastructures can generate a process of economic growth, enhanced capacities, 
and further expansions in a cumulative process that ultimately result in broad-based economic 
performances. 
The fact that between 30 to 50 per cent of economic growth is explained by the results 
suggests that there is good reason to expand the analysis to include other determinants of growth, 
particularly external factors like international trade and finance. As such, from a policy point-of-
view, it can be concluded a singular focus on inflation targeting is weak in terms of generating 
economic growth. It is vulnerable to global economic performances. A positive combination of 
policies that cover a spectrum of goals – monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, trade and capital, and 
social – is argued to be more conducive for broad-based economic performances. The fear of 
inflation is not only limiting but also not healthy to inflation targeters. 
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LIST OF COUNTRIES (Year of Adoption of Inflation Targeting):  
Australia (1993), Brazil (1999), Canada (1991), Chile (1999), Colombia (1999), Czech Republic 
(1998), Hungary (2001), Iceland (2001), Mexico (2001), New Zealand (1990), Peru (2002), 
Philippines (2002), Norway (2001), South Africa (2000), South Korea (2001), Sweden (1993), 
Thailand (2000), United Kingdom (1992) 
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Table 1: Regression Results on Inflation-Growth Tradeoff 
Dependent: Growth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 Constant  4.345 4.272 4.474 4.449 4.318 3.985 3.922 4.267 3.616 3.450 3.516 3.249 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inflation -0.154 -0.117 -0.150 -0.217 -0.196 -0.188 -0.201 -0.183 -0.124 -0.132 -0.139 -0.135 
 -0.017 -0.447 -0.021 -0.002 -0.006 -0.008 -0.003 -0.013 -0.015 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 
Inflation-Square  -0.003           
  -0.792           
Inflation-Lagged   -0.004          
   -0.919          
Government Expenditure    0.099 0.093 0.230 0.287 0.090     
    0.070 0.080 0.154 0.030 0.094     
Current Account Balance    -0.045 -0.042 -0.078 -0.036 -0.084     
    -0.053 -0.075 -0.001 -0.109 0.000     
Current Account-Lagged    -0.027         
    -0.364         
Fixed Capital Formation         0.112 0.148 0.114 0.132 
         0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Education Expenditure         0.020 0.081   
         0.449 0.020   
Labor Force           0.106 0.246 
           0.168 0.118 
Emerging Country 1.389 1.382 1.335 1.496 1.391 1.868 1.986 1.443 1.183 1.616 1.174 1.633 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Government Exp. in Emerging      -0.154 -0.215      
      -0.328 -0.109      
Current Account in Emerging      0.145  0.152     
      0.001  0.000     
Fixed Capital Form in Emerging          -0.053  -0.033 
          -0.116  -0.426 
Education Exp. in Emerging          -0.068   
          -0.071   
Labor Force in Emerging            -0.212 
            -0.275 
Dummy  2001 -2.189 -2.195 -2.285 -2.269 -2.169 -2.217 -2.340 -2.088 -1.610 -1.785 -1.592 -1.606 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dummy 2002 -1.788 -1.780 -1.885 -1.945 -1.836 -1.894 -1.996 -1.776 -1.268 -1.420 -1.241 -1.234 
 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 
Dummy 2003 -1.531 -1.514 -1.627 -1.825 -1.698 -1.695 -1.782 -1.631 -1.441 -1.544 -1.355 -1.368 
 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dummy 2004 -0.215 -0.210 -0.311 -0.438 -0.307 -0.386 -0.435 -0.293 -0.442 -0.580 -0.457 -0.474 
 -0.596 -0.609 -0.461 -0.224 -0.425 -0.409 -0.304 -0.493 -0.190 -0.095 -0.187 -0.189 
Dummy 2005 -0.685 -0.685 -0.781 -1.092 -0.937 -0.941 -1.018 -0.880 -1.002 -1.087 -0.896 -0.891 
 -0.154 -0.158 -0.115 -0.022 -0.053 -0.089 -0.040 -0.103 -0.020 -0.012 -0.038 -0.044 
Adjusted R-Square 0.315 0.309 0.312 0.355 0.348 0.396 0.354 0.396 0.531 0.544 0.531 0.532 
F-Statistics 8.049 6.983 7.028 6.841 7.368 7.381 6.878 8.016 14.500 12.613 14.489 12.074 
Note: Numbers below the coefficients are p-values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
